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L’infanticide est généralement considéré comme une infraction typique-
ment féminine. Cette caractérisation sexuée sert fréquemment d’explication
au fait que, dans la deuxième moitié du XIXe siècle, ce crime passa du statut
de crime capital à un statut de moindre gravité. On a affirmé que cette atté-
nuation était due à la condition malheureuse de la meurtrière et les travaux
historiques l’ont généralement dépeinte comme une femme séduite et aban-
donnée. Le présent article entend au contraire démontrer que la législation
italienne, à partir du premier Code pénal de 1890 prévoyait une punition
légère principalement au bénéfice des hommes qui tuaient un enfant pour
défendre leur honneur masculin. Ce fut encore plus visible sous la législation
fasciste de 1930, et jusqu’en 1981, lorsque la circonstance atténuante de
l’honneur fut abolie. Ce n’est qu’alors que l’infanticide devint une infraction
féminine et maternelle. La loi nouvelle conserve cependant de nombreux
défauts.
Infanticide is usually considered as a typically female offence. This gen-
dered characterization is often used to explain why, in the second half of the
nineteenth century, this crime was transformed from a serious one, punished
with death penalty, to a lesser offence. It has been argued that punishment
was reduced because of the unfortunate conditions of the murderess. And his-
torical studies have usually portrayed the offender as a woman who was
seduced and abandoned. This article will demonstrate instead that Italian
legislation, beginning with the first Penal Code in 1890, mandated light pun-
ishment above all for the benefit of the men who killed an infant to defend
their male honor. This was even more apparent under the Fascist law of 1930
until 1981 when honor was dropped as an extenuating circumstance. Only
then infanticide became a female, maternal crime. Yet, the new Italian law
has many flaws.
Iwould like to begin with a fiction in the archive of the Criminal Court ofFlorence 2. On June 16, 1889, a 14-year-old boy happened upon the deterio-
rated corpse of a baby in a ditch in Sesto Fiorentino, a town near Florence. The local
1 Patrizia Guarnieri is associate professor of contemporary history at the University of Florence and in
the International Doctorate on «Citizenship, rights and gender equality in modern and contemporary
history», at the University of Naples L’Orientale.
2 For the quoted expression I obviously refer to Zemon Davis (1987, especially pp. 3-4). My archival
sources are in Archivio di Stato di Firenze, Tribunale di Firenze. Atti Penali, s. Processi risolti con
sentenza, 1889, 899, b. 1323.
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police arrived upon the scene and a few days later discovered that a woman in the
town named Ottavia had been pregnant. But she no longer was so, nor was there any
baby to be seen. Ottavia was 29 years old and had two small children. She was a
straw weaver and a widow. The town midwife was interrogated, and confirmed that
she had examined the woman at the 8thmonth of pregnancy and had since heard that
the baby had been delivered. At that point the carabinieri (a sort of national police
corps) went to visit Ottavia, carried out a rather “astute interrogation” and arrested
her. She admitted to having given birth to a live son, but claimed she had not caused
his death. After lengthy investigation, the doctors established that the baby had been
born more than six weeks before being found, and that his cranium had been
crushed. Following her arrest, the woman went before the judge to accuse her lover
of the past year, but this man was nowhere to be found. Strangely enough, the judge
sent out forces to search for this man, a certain Raffaello, who was 48 years of age,
a stagecoach driver, married with three children and apparently in hiding. He was
then apprehended, arrested, and both were accused, she for infanticide and he for
homicide.
From the papers of the trial, we can see that in this kind of crime narrative, in
which the woman usually appears to be alone, there are in fact many different voices
present : the official midwife, a medium contacted by the man to discover if his lover
was really pregnant, another woman to procure an abortion, and a few men cited by
Raffaello as her lovers; other actors included a hotelkeeper, the carabinieri, neigh-
bors, and others from the town as well as from Florence. But most importantly, we
are presented with a man and a woman who, accusing each other of the death of the
baby, reveal a remarkably different emotional perception and experience of their
relationship as a couple.
I must, however, interrupt the narrative at this point, resisting the temptation to
continue in my vein as micro-historian, but I will return to it later. This brief story
raises several questions, more than we are able to answer with what is generally
known about the history of infanticide. That is why I chose this specific case
study among various others, as it presents rather unusual features, beginning with
two factors. First, the judicial inquiry looks not only at the mother’s responsibility,
but takes into account that of the father too; his intention was not to appear at all.
Instead the authorities searched for him. Second, the two are charged with different
offenses– infanticide and homicide respectively – for the same criminal deed: the
killing of their newborn son. The trial took place in 1889 in Florence, just before the
first unitary penal code came into force in all of Italy, almost thirty years after the
country’s unification3. The judicial context in which infanticide was defined in this
new Italian criminal code of 1890 – and then through the fascist one and then that of
the republic up to the present law, established in 1981 – appears to be very different
from the legal and cultural framework which preceded 1890. Suddenly, this new
legal context put aside very complex questions that had been taken into considera-
tion before, especially in Tuscan law, and left them completely unanswered. With
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3 Until 1890 Tuscany had been the only region which had maintained its own penal code, under many
respects the most advanced, while in all the other provinces of the Kingdom the hegemony of the
House of Savoy over the process of national unification had meant an extension of its penal code
(Sardinia-Piedmont) over the national territory after unification in 1860-1861.
the disorientation that my brief opening narrative of Ottavia and Raffaello might
provoke, at the beginning of an analysis of infanticide in modern Italian legal his-
tory, I would like to stress that removal and ignorance have weighed terribly up to
the present time and that a re-examination of the past is needed. In order to do it
effectively, I believe that we need a methodological proposal for a new approach. I
would like to underline that, if we intend to rethink infanticide by cases –that is, to
reason from the singularity—then it is necessary to rid the field of a few miscon-
ceptions and to discuss some commonplace issues4. To do this, we need to analyse
laws and the corpus of jurisprudence, apparently not so fascinating, but that, in our
case, are full of surprises.
I came to this also by looking at our present situation. In today’s crime news, at
least in the Italian media, there are an amazing number of cases of very young chil-
dren being killed5. In Italy public opinion is convinced that infanticide is on the
increase, while criminologists consider it a crime which is almost extinct all over
Europe and especially in Italy6. How do we explain the gap between what the gen-
eral public perceives and what the statistics of the experts affirm? Certainly, we are
talking about two different things, meaning that the public considers any killing of
small children as infanticide, without taking into account the selective criteria con-
tained in law. On the other hand, it is precisely these criteria that make the law
appear anachronistic, say the jurists. For a variety of reasons, we are not able to fit
what happens in reality to one model.
What the law says and what people see is that the person who commits infanti-
cide is given a light sentence, so she is in some way excused. What could be the rea-
son behind this? The most common perception is the persistent idea that the mother
who kills her own child is alone, single, abandoned, and with financial problems that
prevent her from supporting her child. This is a reassuring stereotype of the past
compared to the reality that mothers who kill are usually married, in the upper-mid-
dle class income bracket, and are not suffering from evident psychiatric pathologies.
The stereotype, instead, strongly echoes (almost as if it were influenced by it) the
historiographic thesis that holds the child killer of yesteryear to have been usually
seduced and abandoned.
Perhaps we need to take into consideration the idea that is finally gaining ground
among social scientists that “current trends need to be understood in their historical
context”, because a number of policies and legislative actions – which are not usu-
ally receptive to the contribution of historians – seem to base themselves on histori-
cal beliefs and axioms without being aware of doing so, and without adequate
awareness of the changes that have occurred in the meantime 7. Here we refer to our
idea of family, of assistance, including support figures for the most vulnerable mem-
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4 See Passeron, Revel (2005).
5 Recent cases outside Italy might include the little English girl, Madeleine McCann, who disappeared
in Portugal on May 2007 and whose mother has been suspected by the police (until July 08).
6 Some experts stress that, on the other hand, there is an increasing number of mothers who kill their
children and are considered not criminal but insane; see Ponti, Fiorentini (1887-1891, p. 158), with
data of infanticide in Italy from 1950 to 1981 and more recent data in Merzagora (1992) and Ciappi
(2002, pp. 84-89).
7 This is a central point, for ex., in the interdisciplinary project with an anthropological agenda funded by
the European Union’s Sixth Framework Programme, Kinship and Social Security regarding 8 European
countries, Italy included, and coordinated by Patrick Heady; see http://www.eth.mpg.de/kass/.
bers of the family, and especially of those who run the risk of becoming either
victims or perpetrators of family crimes in those infanticides committed nowadays
by women with families.
Let us focus more closely on the typical profile of the perpetrator of infanticide
as she emerges from the history of such cases. We already know many of them – in
Italy I find in Prosperi’s recent book, Dare l’anima (Giving the soul), a classic case.
Lucia is a servant who lives alone with her widowed mother, and who is seduced by
no other than a priest encountered on the eve of Carnival in 1709, during the cele-
brations in the streets of Bologna. The court, which at that time and place depended
on the law of the Papal States to which Bologna belonged, condemned her to a
painful death by guillotine without burial, unless she repented publicly in order to
save her soul. The story itself fires the imagination and is rendered powerfully by
Prosperi : it has all the right ingredients. Even later, for at least two centuries, women
who killed their children would continue to correspond to Lucia’s profile : a lonely
servant-girl with no family protection, whether raped or not by a man who moves in
and out of her life without leaving a trace8.
What changes after the Napoleonic Code during the second half of the 19th C. is
the length of the penalty for the infanticide which is reduced considerably to a
maximum of around 10 years. How are we to explain this? I would suggest that the
focus had shifted radically, and that the sentence was not determined on the basis of
the identity of the most defenceless victim in the world, the newborn baby, but of the
author of the crime and the motivation for it. That is why infanticide is so fascinat-
ing in the history of law: from a ‘botanical’ correspondence between crime and pun-
ishment to a vision which admits a variety of subjective motivations; from “who did
it?” to “who exactly this person is and why he/she did it” 9.
Because we are looking at the female author of infanticide instead of the infant,
we might say that the crime came to be punished less because women were punished
less. In general, crimes carried out by females are considered less serious than those
committed by males, as has also been suggested by the authors and editors, Margaret
L. Arnot and Cornelie Usborne, of Gender and crime in modern Europe10. However,
this response, which is based on the female gender of the perpetrators of infanticide,
does not leave us completely satisfied.
There are two main aspects that this hypothesis cannot explain. 1) The punish-
ment for this extreme offence against an infant loses ground exactly when the child
finally acquires importance: in the second half of the 19th C. children become the
autonomous objects of scientific investigation and are no longer studied as minia-
ture adults. Most importantly, their existence and growth is no longer seen as the pri-
vate affair of the family, but as a resource for the nation and society in its entirety.
2) A reduced penalty, apparently conceded to the gender considered less criminal,
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8 See, for ex., Pelaja (1981), Casarini, and, of course Prosperi (2006). Outside Italy, Ruggiero (1992)
and see the collected essays in Jackson, M., (ed.), Infanticide. Historical perspectives on child
murder and concealment 1550-2000, Aldershot- Burlington, Ashgate Pub., 2002; Schulte, R., The
village in court. Arson, infanticide and poaching in the court records of Upper Bavaria 1848-1910,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994 (or. ed. 1989).
9 This passage from one question to the other one was pointed by Foucault (1978) who in fact chose to
talk about some supposed infanticides as the most significant cases in his course on Les anormaux
1974-1975 (1999).
10 See Arnot and Usborne (eds.) (1999).
refers in reality also to men – indeed, it is intended in particular for them, in my esti-
mation. Men are often present in cases of infanticide, even if historians do not seem
to have dedicated much attention to them.
The historiographic proposal which emerges from the book previously cited, as
regards gender and crime, was correctly the following: let’s look for more women in
the history of crime which seems to be a sphere acted out and judged exclusively be
men, and where women only appear as victims, or secondary figures (accomplices)
or where they are guilty of minor offences (even when they are the authors of life-
threatening crimes such as infanticide)11. I share the views expressed by Arnot and
Usborne but my proposal here is that we start looking for the men involved in so-
called female crimes such as infanticide, or prostitution etc.
Why should we women historians also let men get away and disappear from the
scene of the crime? They have often left behind important clues and traces of evi-
dence, and finding them would allow us to understand a great deal. Certainly, they
have left many fingerprints in the legislation, and that is why I propose a new focus
on the laws, before we continue examining the cases. From this new angle, Italian
legislation is extremely interesting. The first Italian Penal Code, effective from
thirty years after the unification of Italy, is the Zanardelli Code of 1889-90. The sec-
ond Penal Code, entitled Rocco P.C., dates back to 1930, but in 1981 the law on
infanticide changes, and therefore we have had three different laws on that crime
from 1890 to the present. That is not all : before 1890 there were both the Sardinian
Penal Code which was extended to the rest of Italy after 1861, and the Tuscan PC :
Tuscany refused to give up its much-admired legislation by which the death penalty
had been abolished as early as 1786. And, of course, before 1861 there were the var-
ious pre-unification states, each with their own codes.
The first surprise when we observe the changes in the Italian legislation is that
this crime, which is now considered essentially female and maternal, has only been
so in law for the past 26 years. The law of 1981 is the first in Italy to define infanti-
cide as exclusively the crime of a mother who kills her newborn baby under pre-
defined circumstances. We will examine these shortly. While it is true that, accord-
ing to the Napoleonic Code, it was illegal to search for the fathers of illegitimate
children, as explained by Rachel Fuchs12 and this ban on paternity searches was imi-
tated by the Italian Civil Code of 186513, the laws on infanticide before 1981 made
reference to men, and this is an Italian peculiarity14. But who exactly were they
referring to?
In the Penal Code of 1890, at art. 369, there is a sort of indirect list, which refers
to the mother of the infant : these men were (her) brothers, father (natural or by adop-
tion) and husband. Consequently, the mother was not always a single woman but
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11 Arnot, Usborne, 1999. It is interesting that the same proposal – let’s study women as criminals not
only as victims – comes from a group of psychologists and social scientist who work with juvenile
delinquents nowadays. They argue that specific strategies to prevent and cope with girls who com-
mitted crimes, and denounce a lack of analysis by gender: See Ciuffi et alii (Eds.) (2007).
12 See Fuchs’ essay in this volume.
13 Cfr. Romanelli (1995).
14 The infanticide has exclusively been referred to the mother of the victim in other countries, unless in
Spain where the mother’s parents were considered too (P.C. 1826). See also the case of Italian moth-
ers under trial for alleged infanticide in Argentina (P.C., 1887 like the Spanish one) discussed by
Kristen Ruggiero (1992).
sometimes an adulteress. All of the other male authors of infanticide are given the
same punishment as the mothers, meaning from 3-10 years in prison.
In 1930, art. 578 PC opens up the list to include even more male figures, and not
just the woman’s family members but ‘anyone’. The law states, in these precise
words, “Whoever provokes the death of a newborn immediately after birth or of a
foetus during delivery…”15. Actually, there is no distinction in punishment for
accomplices to the crime, who receive the same sentence of 3-10 years.
Summing up, the possible authors of infanticide are therefore the mother, close
male family members until 1890, and many others after 1930. Who might these oth-
ers be? Jurists of the time tell us that Fascist legislators had in mind above all the
fathers of the infants who had been murdered - the lovers of those women who had
not procured an abortion, having given birth to a child that the man rejected. I have
said ‘fathers’ but, significantly, no one ever uses this word to refer to them as they
do not want to acknowledge the child; these men are not attached to their biological
paternity. On the contrary, women are always defined as mothers, with no consider-
ation of the fact whether they ever wanted to be pregnant. These men may have mur-
dered the child themselves, but the other novelty of the 1930 law is that they could
also, as could the illegitimate mother’s relatives, avoid dirtying their hands: anyone
who committed this crime would be accused only of minor homicide, if he had acted
according to the motivations foreseen in the code or for the “purpose of favoring
anyone involved” who had those motivations.
What might these motivations be? This is the fulcrum of our thesis. The light
penalty does not depend on the presumed female nature of this crime, but rather on
the motivation which defines it as second-class homicide, and that categorizes it
therefore as a male as well as female crime. The same formula is used in 1890 and
1930 to define this motive, which is to save one’s honor. Whose honor, we may ask?
The mention of ‘one’s own honor’ in the first Italian law indicated the honor of the
illegitimate mother or adulteress, the loss of which was to be felt not only, nor nec-
essarily, by the woman herself16, but also and above all by the men she was related
to as wife, sister, descendent or adopted daughter. The legal texts of this period
praise the legislators who had seen fit to diminish the punishment of not only the
woman but also of male relatives, who also lost honor. A woman and a man’s honor
were one and the same: her chastity and her faithfulness. Those were not reciprocal,
but applied exclusively to the female gender.
In a way, infanticide in 1890 is seen as a family crime, not because it offends the
family, but paradoxically because it intends to protect it. Naturally, the family was
conceived as one with a male head (the father of the pregnant woman or prospective
husband) in which men are considered more important and the only ones designated
to make decisions. Do we think that the woman who had just delivered a baby was
consulted regarding her original intentions for her baby and herself, when it was
clear that it was the father, brother, or husband who took the infant from its mother
and killed or abandoned it? The mother’s will was not taken into consideration, but
instead the will of whoever had killed or abandoned her child. This regarded, in any
case, the family of the illegitimate mother or adulteress, and therefore the list of pos-
46 PATRIZIA GUARNIERI
15 See art 578 Italian P.C. 1930, and Manzini (1964, pp. 56-75).
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sible perpetrators of infanticide foreseen in art. 369 did not include non-family
members.
In the 1930 law this limitation has disappeared. Anyone was in a position to act
to save their own honor, which clearly no longer referred only to women (whose
honor was a male gender construction and was defended by male family members),
but also to men. Family honor involved the defence of the family as an abstract legal
institution – not the flesh and blood family of the single woman, but also the married
seducer’s family (who remained unaware of the behaviour of their Don Giovanni
and the birth of a baby) or even his eventual future family (if he was a bachelor).
This abstract but legal institution of the family held that any man could contract a
regular marriage that would later produce his own legitimate children, so much the
better if they were males.
The law of 1890 had not contemplated the case of “a man with family who must
conserve its tranquillity and social position”. Incredibly, fascist legislation dealt
with that omission: if the man “destroyed the evidence of his past acts that could
ruin his future», he had to be favoured with attenuating circumstances for having
killed in order to save his reputation17. The prominence of male honor is finally clear
in law. Therefore, to save his honor, it is the man who refuses to acknowledge father-
hood – a word that is never mentioned – as a natural instinct or a responsibility. We
could add that this enormous tolerance during fascism regarded not only the killing,
but also the abandonment of a newborn by anyone (art. 578 and art. 592 C.P. 1930).
Despite its rhetoric glorifying the mamma italiana, Fascist legislation effectively
gave men more power to operate independently with little regard for the woman;
she was stripped of any chance of making decisions about herself and her baby.
In 1981 the law no. 492 abolished any and all attenuating factors regarding motives
of honor and therefore all the laws that had contemplated it were abrogated or altered.
Consequently, the text of art. 578 of the Penal Code had to be radically altered: men
disappeared from the scene of the crime and from the definition of infanticide. Today,
an accusation of infanticide can be brought only against the mother who acts not to
save anyone’s honor, but because she has suffered “conditions of abandonment […]
connected to childbirth” (art. 578, from 1981). With this change in motivation, infan-
ticide simply becomes a female and maternal crime. To confirm that earlier light
penalties were not intended to favor women, we can observe that sentences have now
increased somewhat for the mother (from 4 to 12 years) and instead decreased for
accomplices. Accordingly, men risk less than the woman if they act for the “purpose
of favouring the mother”, as if there weren’t other ways of helping her.
At this point we need to take a closer look at the female perpetrator of infanti-
cide, who now appears completely alone, with no one to help her, and indeed in a
state of «material and moral abandon», as the law now states. What types of aban-
donment can diminish her guilt, assuming that she is mentally sane? The only
motive for abandonment acknowledged by law as an attenuating factor for killing
her own newborn (while the killing of his or her own child is still considered aggra-
vated homicide) is the lack of health assistance at the moment of birth. Moral aban-
donment may be added to material abandonment, but – here the legislator is very
clear – only as a consequence.
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The new jurisdictional definition of infanticide is very restrictive, and also
anachronistic. The 1981 law doesn’t seem to take into account all the numerous pre-
ceding norms that have altered the context in Italy. The main three are the following:
1. since 1974 abortion is legal and medical assistance is provided (this has certainly
prevented infanticides) ;
2. since 1975 the new family law recognizes the equal status of husband and wife
and abolishes the legal category of illegitimacy (albeit, ambiguously) ;
3. since 1978 the National Public Health System guarantees medical assistance to
all males and females, with or without Italian citizenship, including female
immigrants without any sort of document (the so-called clandestine category)18.
Thus medical assistance at delivery is always available, except in the case of
women living on the very margins of society. In fact, whenever a mother prefers not
to go to the hospital she cannot legally be considered abandoned and therefore jus-
tified if she kills her baby, as sentenced by the Italian Supreme Court in 198519.
It is evident that most cases of murdered children - that media portray incorrectly
as infanticides and turn into a spectacle - do not at all fall into the current judicial
definition of this crime. This explains why criminologists call it a crime in extinc-
tion, while the public perceives it to be on the increase. Surely, the attention of psy-
chologists and psychiatrists towards (technically non-infanticidal) parents who kill
their sons/daughters has grown: mothers who do not fit in the typical profile of the
materially abandoned woman (almost all of them have a house, a family and a hus-
band who never detected anything before the impending tragedy), or fathers who
often declare or pre-.announce their motivations. Even during judicial enquiries, the
use of psychiatric examination – an increasingly frequent means of appraisal in gen-
eral – has become constant, in the attempt to explain a crime which appears to be
socially inconceivable and which is beyond the imagination even of the closest fam-
ily members of the perpetrator. The systematic resort to psychiatric expertise to
establish the mental insanity of the women under investigation is moreover used to
avert the most serious charge of child murder otherwise required by the tight
requirements of the law on infanticide. But even in the very limited cases which
allow the application of the law of 1981, the advisability of keeping it has been ques-
tioned. On the one hand, this law refuses preliminarily to take into account any psy-
chological conditions attached to maternity; on the other, it only recognizes serious
psychiatric pathology, which, as a result, excludes legal responsibility, as in the case
of any crime committed in conditions of mental insanity. However, I’m interested in
underlining another aspect of this contradictory and much-discussed law, which is
pertinent to our discussion. We all know that juridical definitions are oriented by
certain conceptions regarding gender. The female protagonist of infanticide estab-
lished by the 1981 law is a biological mother, whether married or not, who becomes
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18 Since this article was completed, the Italian Senate approved a legislative decree presented by the
government of Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s that, on grounds of security, contemplates that
physicians would denounce to the police illegal migrants when they ask for health care. This decree
(d.d.l. 773/ 2009) has aroused a storm of protests, especially from physicians themselves.
19 See Corte di Cassazione (which is the final level of judgment), sez. 1, sent. 16 April 1985, see
Ambrosetti’s comments on it (1992, p. 50).
a criminal because she is overwhelmed by that ‘natural’ event of femininity called
childbirth.
It is precisely this concept, I believe, which is the principle anachronism of a law
which comes paradoxically after the explosion of the women’s movement in Italy
which fought for abortion and divorce. The latter measures were approved via ref-
erendum by the Italian people, a majority of whom are nominally Catholic, but who
do not follow the dictates of the Roman Catholic Church. Instead, the most recent
law on infanticide incorporates an almost 19th C. view of women, or rather, a natu-
ralistic one which we normally attribute to the 1800s. Becoming a mother is limited
to giving birth, erasing any other aspect of maternity, including the so called moth-
erhood constellation20, and women’s experienced relationships, above all, with their
child.
Paradoxically, 19th C. codes elaborated a more fully developed cultural concept
of the woman who commits infanticide. She committed the act not because she gave
birth without any help, but because she was desperate enough to have a child with-
out a father, and thus risked losing not only her highly acclaimed honor but any
means of sustenance, male family protection (if she had one), and above all the main
possibility for a woman which was a matrimony. She was guilty of only a minor
crime because she was entitled to recognition as a victim, not of the natural event of
childbirth, but of a cultural mentality which discriminated against her and ruined her
life.
Even the formula that establishes the timing of infanticide alluded to cultural and
not natural notions in the 1890 PC. When exactly does the act itself take place? The
crime has to have taken place “immediately after or during delivery” according to
the law of 1930 as well as the present one. In the present version, the timing involved
indicates a strict and explicit reference to a traumatic event, female by nature (espe-
cially if there is no medical assistance). Interestingly enough, the same timing was
applied before 1981 to male perpetrators of infanticide as well, who certainly did not
give birth. The reasoning behind this can be understood by examining the previous
law of 1890, which was extremely precise (so much so that it was cut) : infanticide
was to have been committed ”within the first 5 days after birth”, because the infant
had “still not been written into the birth register”. The killing of this child counted
less because his/her birth itself (illegitimate) was considered of scarse value and as
belonging to the private sphere. Those few who knew of it, beside the mother, could
certainly be counted on to keep the double secret : of the lost honor and of the elim-
ination of the ‘evidence’.
The nineteenth-century law, in fact, considered the ‘illegitimate’ child just that,
«dishonorable evidence», and that explains why punishments for infanticides due
to honor were so reduced, despite the openly acknowledged value of the child in the
culture of the late 1800s and 1900s. Finally that question which remains unsolved by
the thesis of the female nature of this crime has an answer: the defence both of the
most defenceless of all beings and of life as supreme value as declared in juridical
texts were sacrificed to protect the legitimacy of the family institution.
Turning our attention to men when we are discussing the most female of crimes
restores a real complexity to our picture, and counters the risks of naturalizing and
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to other theories on the internal and relational world of both the mother and the infant.
removing female criminals form their historical context. This is a long-lasting risk,
in my opinion, which we usually attribute to the 19th century positivistic idea of
woman but is still evident in science, law, and historical research as well. In Italian
law, the woman perpetrator of infanticide is, on the one hand, seen sociologically as
living on the fringe of society (so much so that she does not even have access to free
health care, normally available to everyone), and, on the other hand, as a physical
body with neither will nor emotions. Strangely enough, some female members in the
Italian Parliament from the Communist and Catholic parties were the ones who
requested, in the late Seventies, that the new law ignore psychological and subjec-
tive conditions of the mother who committed infanticide, reasoning that these con-
siderations diminished the dignity of a woman and were a by-product of male chau-
vinism!21
On the contrary, until 1981 men who killed the dishonoring newborn were seen
as being driven by fury and justified for their virile shame, jealousy and rage, and all
this in no manner reduced their dignity. Emotions are normally attributed to women,
while men are usually recognized as exercising a rational control over their emo-
tions22. But here again the tables are turned: emotions are denied to women, and
accepted in men and not seen as antithetical to rationality and dominant social val-
ues.
Yet, the cases which emerge from our archives spill over with the emotions of
those incriminated and of the judges themselves. This is the last aspect to which I
would like to draw some attention, aware of having had to neglect many others.
When from our sources we are able to uncover not only an isolated woman but a
whole network of individuals surrounding her, we are in a better position to under-
stand not only what and how those men and women felt, but how people thought
about how to feel and express their feelings23. We can perceive shared social values
– honor, the legitimacy of birth and maternity, life itself – together with a variety of
different individual gender-oriented expectations, emotions and choices. The law of
1981 has finally affirmed that honor, as an excuse for infanticide, no longer repre-
sents a value in Italian society; but on the other hand it brought forward a natural-
ized and a-historical idea of maternity. In this respect too, it seems that a legislation
which should have been modernizing was not aware of historical transformation and
of the possibilities for the present times that knowledge of the past might have sug-
gested.
Now we are prepared to return to the case we opened this essay with, back to the
outskirts of Florence in 1889, so as to better understand some of the questions that
we left unanswered (without pretending to exhaust here the analysis of such an
intriguing case). Raffaello, the man in our story and Ottavia’s lover, told the judge
that he had had nothing to do with the dead baby24. He had not killed it ; it was not
his son but someone else’s. Ottavia was not his lover – he had gone to her a few
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21 See Ravaioli 1979 on the Disegno di legge no. 112 at the Italian Senate. A more detailed reconstruc-
tion of these legislative debates is in Guarnieri (2005).
22 For the stereotyped association that gendered honor as male and rational, contrasting with « senti-
mentality» as female and unreasonable, see Reddy (1997).
23 See Rosenwein’s review essay (2002).
24 Trial against Ottavia Cresci and Raffaello Pini, Archivio di Stato di Firenze, Tribunale di Firenze.
Atti Penali, s. Processi risolti con sentenza, 1889, 899, b. 1323.
times, paying her as a prostitute, and other men went too. Who were these other
men, the judge asked. Raffaello gave the name of the local carpenter and a few oth-
ers, but they all denied any involvement when interrogated. She was a good woman,
people said; he had been her only lover for a year, and everybody knew it. Ottavia
said that Raffaello was with her when the baby was born; as soon as it came out he
had let it fall and crushed it in his hands. After this he disappeared for a number of
days. When he came back, she wanted to leave him but he convinced her to spend
one more night together. When they saw each other again a week later, she was by
then even more determined to interrupt the relationship. But when she told him so,
he struck her, tried to rape her and threatened to disinter the corpse, and tell every-
one that the baby was dead. Ottavia responded that he was the one who had killed it.
Raffaello replied that no one would have believed her - it’s the woman’s fault
because she’s the one who gives birth. However, this time Ottavia didn’t give in.
A few days later Ottavia learned that the body of her little baby had been found
and immediately understood that Raffaello intended to ruin her. She hadn’t wanted
this pregnancy, she cried because she knew that her services as a maid would no
longer be requested, and she was ashamed. But she had been concerned about the
baby and had even called the midwife to her home more than once, as the midwife
herself later confirmed. On the other hand, her lover had reassured her that he would
take care of everything, even the midwife, and would have paid her to take the baby
to the Spedale degli Innocenti, the well known foundling hospital in Florence25.
That’s why he had taken her bracelet and ring and taken them to the Monte di Pietà
(an institution for pawning goods). Didn’t he remember, she asked?
The judge before whom they had their confrontation most surely sympathized
with the widow. Ottavia is shown as being “moved and energetic” in telling her story
in front of her ex-lover, who stood silently after so many lies. Ottavia was certainly
not mad -the question of her insanity did not arise26 –, nor was she foolish – she had
already had two children before her husband died. Nor was she the typical seduced
and abandoned woman. We are not interested at this point in concluding that she was
innocent, that she did not murder her child. The issue is that her story makes us think
that the stereotype that infanticide was a typically female and thus minor crime does
not hold, because too limiting and often misleading.
We have the obligation to ask ourselves why the female criminal is so reduced to
a natural object as to be deprived even of her emotions, while on the contrary men
are not, and yet they are judged with equal or more tolerance if they kill a newborn
child. This case may suggest that by recognizing Ottavia’s emotions, the gap
between her ambivalent feelings as a woman and the feelings considered acceptable
for a woman in her circumstance was too wide. Perhaps she didn’t share the idea that
killing her child immediately after birth was a sort of minor offence, as stated in the
male-oriented law, which, at any cost, defended the institution of the family headed
by men.
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and 2004; also Viazzo, Bortolotto, Zanotto (1994).
26 Very few the infanticide women seemed to go under plea for insanity in the late XIXth C. and early
XXth C. Italy, as Selmini (1987) stated and the cases in Florence confirm. The current tendency is
the opposite (Friedman, 2005), but it must be noticed that the definition of infanticide as a
minor crime has always regarded ‘normal’ and not pathological mental conditions of the one who
committed it.
As a historian, I should clarify at least one more point about this specific case. I
began by saying that Ottavia had been accused of having committed an infanticide,
while Raffaello was accused of homicide. This difference can be ascribed to the fact
that their trial occurred in Florence, just a few months before the promulgation of the
first Penal Code of the unified Kingdom of Italy by Zanardelli. The two lovers were
thus not judged according to the Italian laws, whose change I have here analysed;
rather, they were judged according to the more advanced Tuscan Penal Code of
1853. Already at that time, this Penal Code considered infanticide as a mother-
related crime (as the Italian laws acknowledged only in 1981), when this was com-
mitted against a child born out of wedlock. The Tuscan Law too punished infanticide
with “special benevolence”; this crime differed in fact substantially from that of
homicide, because the reasons of the mother for committing an infanticide were
taken into account. What made the difference between the two were not the physi-
cal conditions of the mother, including puerperal fever, but rather her psychological
state. According to the great jurist Francesco Carrara, a mother who committed an
infanticide – as well as the one who had an abortion – acted “foreseeing and fearing
the humiliation and the vexations which would be inflicted upon her [by the people],
the coercion she would suffer from her family [...] and the threat of revenge by a
betrayed husband”27. The fear of these “overwhelming tortures” for herself and for
her illegitimate child was subjective, but it was neither unrealistic nor incompre-
hensible. And it had little to do with that misunderstood sense of honour that Italian
laws considered a valid attenuating circumstance instead. The path opened by the
theoretical elaboration of Carrara and by the Tuscan judicial experience went in a
very different direction from the one that the Italian penal law pursued for almost a
century and which was founded on the notion of male honor. The late deletion of the
honor causa in 1981 could not be enough to make a good law. A historical reconsid-
eration of the legal discourse, of the notions available to understand and judge infan-
ticide – as well as maternity and sentimental relations – could in this respect con-
tribute to precious change28.
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